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CASE-COMMENTS
JOHNSON V. SOLOMON: A STATE'S DUTY TO
DEVELOP COMMUNITY-BASED
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the wisdom of deinstitu-
tionalization from a clinical and social work perspective,' this comment fo-
cuses on the constitutional rights of approximately 130,000 mentally ill and
mentally retarded citizens presently confined in state institutions.2 This
1. The deinstitutionalization movement has received many bad reviews. See H. SAN-
TIETSEVAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: OUT OF THEIR BEDS AND INTO THE STREETS
(1979); Bachrach, Is the Least Restrictive Environment Always the Best? Sociological and Se-
mantic Implications, 31 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHOLOGY 97 (1980). However, a more rigorous
analysis of the controversy suggests that deinstitutionalization as a therapeutic model has not
failed; rather the implementation in terms of community care has failed, and that "in every
instance where a comprehensive system of community care for the chronic mentally ill has
been established and evaluated, it [deinstitutionalization] has been successful." Deinstitution-
alization of the Chronically Mentally Ill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) (statement by Leonard I. Stein,
M.D.) [hereinafter Hearing].
2. Hearings, supra note 1, at 185 (statement of John A. Talbott, M.D., Director, Institute
of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, University of Maryland).
Although at first glance, it could be argued that only involuntarily committed citizens (ver-
sus voluntary confinees to state institutions) are protected by the due process clause because of
the requirement of state action, the issue triggers a more complex analysis. For example, in
Association for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484-85 (S.W.N.D.
1982), the court held that the due process clause applied to voluntary confinees as well as those
involuntarily committed on three theories: 1) many so-called "voluntary" confinees, such as
minors, never actually consented as the particular statute required only the consent of the
parents or guardians for a "voluntary" commitment; 2) of those confinees who did consent,
the act did not rise to the constitutional level of informed consent because of the nature of
severe mental retardation; 3) of those confinees who did voluntarily and knowingly consent in
the beginning, they still surrendered some freedom to the state, which although initiated by the
individual confinee, was continued by the state thus constituting state action.
Other courts and a commentator have similarly included voluntary confinees, based on one
or another of these three theories. Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 519 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
(due process clause applied to voluntary confinees on the theory that once the state takes
charge, state action begins, regardless of who initiates); Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill
to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 193, 242 (1980) (argu-
ing for inclusion on the theory of lack of informed consent). At least one court, which held
that as a constitutional issue, there was no state action with voluntary commitments, did rec-
ognize that the factual issue of voluntariness can itself be complex. Goodman v. Parwatikar,
431 F. Supp. 1250, 1253-54 (E.D. Mo. 1977), vacated and remanded, 570 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.
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comment argues that two distinct substantive due process rights attach to
institutionalized citizens: a right to treatment which may involve commu-
nity-based care if the clinicians involved so advise; and a right to confine-
ment in the least restrictive setting which is suitable and reasonably
affordable, which also may involve community placement. In fashioning re-
lief for violations of these due process rights, federal courts may at times
order states to develop substantively more community resources or proce-
durally require states to justify their budgetary priorities.
While the development of a due process right to treatment began histori-
cally with a lone writer in 1960,' Part I of this comment commences discus-
sion of this issue in 1979, utilizing the moderate analysis of Johnson v.
Solomon4 as a continuing thread which renders a cohesive proposition.
Thus, Part I of this comment examines the Johnson opinion, clarifying it in
light of cases upon which it was premised and demonstrating its widespread
acceptance in many jurisdictions. Part II explores the impact of the recent
Supreme Court case, Youngberg v. Romeo,5 and concludes that Johnson re-
mains good law with an added gloss. Finally, Part III tracks three ap-
proaches utilized by federal courts to protect the constitutional rights of the
mentally ill and mentally retarded. Current statistics are highlighted which
indicate that despite a seventy-five percent decrease in the institutionalized
population over the past thirty years, many state mental health agencies still
allocate between eighty and ninety percent of their budgets to institutions.6
The comment concludes that if the Johnson court and its progeny were to
revisit a similar class action today in view of current statistics, it would order
the development of community resources, or at least require the state to
1978) (inter alia, material issue of fact as to whether patient had been committed voluntarily or
involuntarily).
Two commentators have gone even a step further, indeed a step beyond rigorous analysis, to
include citizens not presently committed. One of these authors suggests that the constitutional
right to treatment for confinees continues after they are released in the form of aftercare.
Mort, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 939 (1984).
The other commentator argues even less soundly that even those mental health patients who
have never been confined in institutions possess a due process right to treatment if they become
at all involved in the state mental health system, i.e., that even state-controlled halfway houses
restrict liberties in subtle ways that are sufficient to constitute state action. Rapson, surpa, at
243.
Despite the room for debate, however, the thesis of this case-comment rests narrowly on the
firm foundation that state action is exercised with involuntary commitments and leaves it to
others to consider its application to voluntary commitments.
3. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960).
4. 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979).
5. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
6. Hearings, supra note 1, at 85 (statistics taken from the testimony of John A. Talbott,
M.D.).
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shoulder the burden of proving that community programs, as well as the
funds to develop them, are unavailable.
I. ANALYSIS OF JOHNSON V SOLOMON
Johnson involved, among other claims,7 a section 1983 class suit' against
the Maryland State Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene and other state
officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of juveniles con-
fined to mental institutions, based on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The seventy-six plaintiffs specifically requested a declaration
that there was "a constitutional duty on the part of the state officials to
explore and provide the least stringent practicable alternatives to confine-
ment of Plaintiff class," 9 and an order enjoining "further commitments until
defendants present[ed] a plan for the creation or provision of sufficient ap-
propriate less restrictive alternatives to hospital confinement."'"
A. The Right to Treatment
Developing its analysis in two steps, the court first held that the due pro-
cess clause guaranteed the plaintiffs certain minimum standards of treat-
ment, referring to this as a "solid tenet of constitutional law.""' It reasoned
that the state's right to exercise its parens patriae power over its citizens
created a coterminous state obligation to provide treatment, characterizing
this exchange as a "check and balance on the State's sovereign power to
undertake civil commitments. '"12
As has been suggested, 3 this widely used quid pro quo analysis devolves
into three separate theories. Which of these theories governed the Johnson
decision, however, is not clear. When the court spoke of the "check and
balance," it appeared to be utilizing what may be called the paradigm quid
pro quo theory ("paradigm theory"). This theory suggests that irrespective
of the three purposes a state pursues through civil commitment (protection
of others, protection of the individual, or treatment of the individual), the
state must provide treatment in order to compensate the individual for the
7. The other three claims involved allegations of constitutionally vague and inadequate
commitment standards, constitutionally impermissible lack of periodic review, and constitu-
tionally impermissible lack of effective legal representation. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 281.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
9. Id. at 303 (quoting Plaintiff's reply to post-trial memorandum of Defendant
Solomon).
10. Id. at 282.
11. Id. at 299.
12. Id. at 300.
13. Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive De-
velopment of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 4-15 (1978).
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lack of procedural safeguards that are afforded criminals. However, the
Johnson court also appeared to be utilizing a more narrowly applied pseudo
quid pro quo theory ("pseudo theory") when it stated that the right to treat-
ment arose from the necessary "relationship between the justification for
civil commitment [in only those situations where the justification is treat-
ment] and the need to guarantee that treatment is actually provided."' 4
Two points suggest that the Johnson court relied on the more expansive
paradigm theory. First, the two theories are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive if one views thepseudo theory as a subset of the paradigm theory. Thus,
a court relying on the paradigm theory in general could note, with consis-
tency, that the pseudo theory adds extra justification for commitment when
the state's purpose is treatment. However, since the paradigm theory cannot
be viewed as a subset of the pseudo theory, the Johnson court's language
would be contradictory if the court relied on the more narrow pseudo theory.
A second reason for construing the Johnson opinion in this way is that the
court never inquired as to which of the three purposes the defendants had
been pursuing; such an inquiry would be essential under the pseudo theory.
Thus, the Johnson holding regarding a substantive due process right to treat-
ment is not limited only to those involuntary confinees whom the state com-
mits for the express purpose of treatment, but applies as well to all
involuntary confinees, regardless of the state's purpose for commitment.
B. The Right to Confinement in the Least Restrictive Setting
In the second part of its analysis, the Johnson court held that the confinees
enjoyed a due process right to treatment in the least restrictive setting avail-
able. Upon finding a constitutional defect in the commitment process, the
court then enjoined the defendants from further commitments if adequate
services and programs were alternatively available in the community."5
Three issues require clarification here.
1. Available Intact v. Reasonably Affordable
First, it is unclear how the Johnson court intended to construe the word
"available" as utilized in the "least restrictive setting available" phraseology.
It could have intended either completely to preclude the chance of ever re-
quiring a state to expend any money to develop community resources or
merely to impose a condition of financial reasonableness such that even if
community programs were not available, the state would be obligated to de-
14. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 300.
15. Id. at 303, 305.
Johnson v. Solomon
velop these programs if the funds were available or could be ascertained
through a creative re-shuffling of budgetary priorities.
Starting with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Shelton v. Tucker,
16
that fundamental personal liberties can be encumbered only by the least
drastic means,1 7 the Johnson court then relied on two cases which correctly
applied the Shelton obligation to civil commitments with regard to place-
ment in the community as opposed to an institution: Welsch v. Likens 8 and
Gary W. v. State of Louisiana.9 As the court in both of these key cases
found a due process right to confinement in the least restrictive setting which
is reasonably affordable, it could be argued that the Johnson court intended
the same construction. The Welsch court defined the constitutional right as
requiring the "[s]tate officials to explore and provide the least stringent prac-
ticable alternatives to confinement of noncriminals."2 ° Although not articu-
lated quite as clearly, the Gary W. court similarly defined the right as
requiring the state to consider the "least restrictive alternative," but said the
state "will not be required to develop an entire new system of facilities to
implement the plan."2
In addition to the holdings in these cases, some language in the Johnson
opinion itself precludes a narrow construction of its holding and, implies
that the state's obligation in some situations may require some reasonable
expenditures for community resource development. After drawing a distinc-
tion between the least restrictive "alternative" versus "available" setting, the
court stated: "Whereas the former standard would necessitate that the State
vastly expand its range of therapeutic services ... so as to provide a contin-
uum including all medical alternatives, the latter approach would contem-
plate fewer changes since 'availability' presumably limits financially the
range of services which must be provided."22
Finally, a narrow construction of Johnson is inappropriate since it would
effectively delegate to state budget administrators the court's responsibility
for defining the scope of constitutional rights - a consequence which the
Johnson court surely did not intend. For example, a budget administrator
could define the least restrictive setting available by merely allocating or re-
fusing to allocate funds. Indeed, the court in Clark v. Cohen 2 3 succinctly
16. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
17. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 301, 302.
18. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir. 1977).
19. 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
20. Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 502 (emphasis added).
21. Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1219 (emphasis added).
22. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 301 (emphasis added).
23. 613 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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rejected a similarly narrow construction of the due process right to confine-
ment in the least restrictive setting available, stating that:
Defendants argue that this language allows institutional placement
whenever there are insufficient funds or resources available to pro-
vide for non-residential services. This interpretation would effec-
tively allow defendants to render the standard meaningless. The
defendants could simply refuse to allocate funds for any commu-
nity placements and institutionalize all mentally retarded persons
if I were to accept the proffered reading. I decline to do so.24
Whether or not the Johnson court intended to construe the term "avail-
able" in a narrow fashion may not be as important as its reason for such
cautious language. At three different points in its opinion, the court indi-
cated that its cautious language resulted from, and was perhaps conditioned
upon, a concern for the state's budget and a firm belief in the state's reason-
able, good faith commitment to develop community resources.2 5 Thus, as
will be explored further in Part III, if eight years later the Johnson court
were faced with the revelation that funds were available to develop commu-
nity resources, and that the state's commitment to develop community re-
sources no longer existed, the court might reject a narrow construction of its
1979 opinion, and order the development of these resources. 6
2. Shelton's Application to Civil Commitment
A second point of clarification focuses on Johnson's application of the
Shelton requirement to civil commitment. Although most courts differ only
in how broadly or how narrowly they define the right to confinement in the
least restrictive setting, at least one court has completely rejected the right,
basing its analysis on much-cited dicta in the early Supreme Court case of
Jackson v. Indiana, in which the Court noted: "At the least, due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. '27 In Garrity
v. Gallen,28 the court argued that this dictum demanded that a court provide
only a rational basis review of state action in civil commitment cases, and
that the stricter review granted in Shelton applies only to the first amend-
ment. The Garrity analysis, however, has two flaws.
First, if one is prone to anchoring complex analyses in one-line dicta, then
it is essential to closely scrutinize each word: The Jackson court said "At
24. Id. at 702.
25. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 301-05, 310, 311.
26. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
27. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
28. 522 F. Supp. 171, 236-37 (D.N.H. 1981).
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the least," and suggested generally that it would go no further than needed
in order to strike down the Indiana statute (which allowed criminal defend-
ants to be civilly committed for an indefinite period).2 9 This dictum in no
way precludes a stricter standard of review. Indeed, if anything, it hints that
a stricter standard may be required in some circumstances.
Second, and most importantly, the Garrity court's insistence that strict
judicial scrutiny is unique to the first amendment and not applicable to sub-
stantive due process rights exposes a fundamental flaw in its analysis.
Although it is true that in some substantive due process cases, for example
those involving economic rights, the Supreme Court has applied only a mini-
mum rationality standard of review, 3° it is also settled that when the right
being curtailed by state action is determined to be "fundamental" in nature,
a strict scrutiny analysis is to be applied. Consequently, as in Roe v. Wade,3 1
where a woman's fundamental right to privacy was involved, the state could
interfere significantly with that right only if the governmental act was nar-
rowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. Likewise, in other sub-
stantive due process cases involving the infringement of "fundamental
rights," the Supreme Court has similarly required that the state's means of
achieving that interest be narrowly drawn.32 As to any argument that nar-
rowly drawn is not equivalent to least drastic means, the Shelton court de-
fined the requirement of "least drastic means" by stating that: "[a legitimate
state purpose] cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."33
As applied to involuntarily committed citizens, this analysis examines
whether a "fundamental right" is involved, and if so, whether it is signifi-
cantly curtailed.34 Initially, the right of a citizen to be free from involuntary
confinement by the state is manifestly a "fundamental right," satisfying both
the Supreme Court's general definition in Snyder v. Massachusetts" which
stated that a right is fundamental when it is "so rooted in the tradition and
29. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
30. Williamson v. Lee Optic Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
31. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
32. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (although decision based mostly on
substantive equal protection analysis, the Court suggests that a similar test would apply under
substantive due process analysis regarding fundamental right to marry); Moore v. East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (right to choose family living arrangements); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right of marital privacy encompassing use of contraceptive
devices). It should be noted that in each of these cases, the Supreme Court only required the
state's interest to be "important," rather than "compelling" as in Roe.
33. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (emphasis added).
34. If the state interferes with a citizen's fundamental right but not in a significant way,
then only a rational basis review is triggered. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
35. 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
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conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," and the more
complex test set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut3 6 which noted that a right
is fundamental when it is a "penumbral right" of privacy emanating from
the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 7 Second, as to the level of
interference with this fundamental right, the Supreme Court has stated that
civil commitment is a "massive curtailment of liberty."3 8
Thus, when it is found that an individual's fundamental right of liberty or
privacy is affected by state action, the strict scrutiny standard mandated by
the Roe-Griswold framework requires that state action (civil commitment)
fails unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve the state's articulated purpose.
Accordingly, even though the state's interests in civil commitment are com-
pelling (protection of individual, protection of public, treatment of individ-
ual), placement in institutions is "unnecessarily broad" and not "narrowly
drawn" when placement in a less restrictive environments could adequately
effectuate those state interests.3 9
If, instead of distinguishing Shelton on the basis of first amendment versus
substantive due process grounds, the Garrity analysis distinguished the
stricter review in Shelton because it involved legislative action, whereas civil
commitment involves executive action, then the analysis suffers a different
flaw. Although Shelton, Roe, and Griswold all dealt with legislative action,
whereas Johnson and Garrity addressed executive action, that is precisely the
relationship between a constitutional attack on a statute and a section 198340
class suit against state officials. The two levels involve similar analyses be-
cause of the court's aversion to allowing a state to commit unconstitutional
acts while hiding behind a facially valid statute.4 1 Consequently, the strict
standard of review in Shelton, Roe, and Griswold regarding legislative action
applies in the same manner to the executive act of civil commitment in John-
son and Garrity.
36. 381 U.S. at 479 (1965).
37. Indeed, involuntary commitments also infringe on the right to privacy which Roe and
Griswold specifically addressed as a fundamental right. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
491 (1980) (implying that freedom from reputational injury regarding the stigma of civil com-
mitment may be a fundamental right as is "the right to be free from, and to obtain judicial
relief for, unjustifiable intrusions on personal security").
38. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (emphasis added).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
41. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) ("The mere fact that Romeo [the
involuntary confinee] has been committed under proper procedures does not deprive him of all
substantive liberty interests under the fourteenth amendment.").
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3. Two Distinct Constitutional Rights
In the Johnson analysis, the court's transition from finding a right to treat-
ment to finding a right to placement in the least restrictive environment is
critically confusing: "Having found the existence of a constitutional right to
treatment, this court must now face the tougher, more practical problem of
defining that right in terms of meaningful therapeutic standards as well as
dollars and cents."42 This language, along with the reference to the "right to
treatment in the least restrictive setting," appears to condition the Shelton
right to confinement in the least restrictive setting upon finding the quid pro
quo right to treatment. Not only is this analysis logically inconsistent be-
cause the two analyses are significantly different, but in both of the cases on
which the Johnson court relied, i.e., Welsch and Gary W., the courts viewed
the right to treatment and the right to confinement in the least restrictive
setting as two distinct, independent rights, resulting in two distinct claims.
4 3
Indeed, the Johnson court made a semantic slip that indicated its intention to
follow the key cases when it quoted a section from Gary W in which the
extent of the state's duty to provide a least restrictive setting for a confinee
was examined first in light of Shelton and then as applied to the quid pro quo
theory."
This subtle point has five consequences. First, because the two rights are
wholly distinct both in analysis and application, a plaintiff may obtain com-
munity placement where a claim is based on the right to confinement in the
least restrictive setting even when a court determines that relief may not be
granted on his right to treatment. Second, those courts which utilize the
more narrowly applied pseudo theory to find a right to treatment must still
inquire as to a plaintiff's right to confinement in the least restrictive setting
even where the confinee was committed for reasons other than treatment.
Third, even when a court recognizes both rights, the severity of the affliction
may give rise to different results. For example, whereas institutional treat-
ment may provide the same degree of minimally adequate care to two con-
finees with vastly different functioning skills, the confinee with the higher
potential for independent living may have a right to community placement
since institutional placement is more restrictive for him. Fourth, for
whatever reason, if a court finds no violation of a right to treatment or re-
fuses to recognize such a right, then even if the state still must provide com-
42. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979).
43. In Welsch, the court separated the two rights so as to create two different sections of
the discussion. Thus the court discussed the quid pro quo right to treatment, 373 F. Supp. at
499, and later addressed the Shelton right to confinement in the least restrictive setting. Id. at
502. The Gary W. court similarly distinguished the two rights. 437 F. Supp. at 1217-18.
44. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 303.
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munity placement under the second right, it theoretically need not provide
"treatment" in that placement. Fifth, the Johnson court's failure to clearly
distinguish between the right to treatment and the right to confinement in
the least restrictive setting resulted in an unpersuasive response to one of the
state's main arguments in the dispute. Coupling both rights together, the
state argued that the due process clause required only that state action bear a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose and that community-
based treatment was more than what was reasonably required.4" Although
struggling to justify the distinction throughout the entire case, the court at-
tempted to summarily dismiss the argument by referring back to the quid pro
quo right to treatment: "This analysis [the defendants' argument for rational
basis review], however, is lacking in light of the conclusions reached above
that the State's parens patriae power entails certain obligations of the State
toward the individual."46 Instead of allowing the state to mix and confuse
the constitutional interests involved, the court should have focused on the
strict scrutiny review unique and crucial to the Shelton right to confinement
in the least restrictive setting: the cases on which the defendants' argument
relied, Lockner v. New York, 4 7 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,48 Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,49 all dealt with economic rights, such as the
liberty to contract, which are not considered to be fundamental rights under
a substantive due process analysis and which therefore trigger only a rational
basis review.5°
C. Similar Holdings in Other Jurisdictions
The Johnson opinion is by no means a maverick decision. Indeed, an
overwhelming majority of those federal courts which have addressed the is-
sue have either expressly or implicity recognized a due process right to treat-
ment and confinement in the least restrictive setting. Of at least seventeen
federal district courts which have been confronted with the question, fifteen
have expressly recognized a constitutional due process right to treatment,
5'
45. Id. at 302.
46. Id (emphasis added).
47. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
48. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
49. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
50. Williamson v. Lee Optic Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
51. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 601 F.
Supp. 1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986); Association for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F.
Supp. 473, 487 (S.W.N.D. 1982); Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 517 (N.D.N.Y. 1981);
Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325, 1338 (W.D. Wis. 1981); Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F.
Supp. 908, 914 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 119 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978); Lora v. Board of Educ. of New York,
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one has implied such a recognition, 52 and one has argued that there is no
such right in any form." Of the seven federal circuit courts which have
addressed this same issue, five have expressly found a right to treatment,
54
one has strongly implied a recognition of the right,5" and one has expressly
rejected the right.
56
Of eleven federal district courts which have addressed the right to confine-
ment in the least restrictive setting, eight have expressly recognized such a
right,5 7 two have implied such a right, 58 and only one has expressly rejected
such a right.5 9 Although no federal circuit courts have expressly recognized
or rejected a due process right to confinement in the least restrictive setting,
three have implicity recognized the right,' and one has implicitly rejected
the right.6 '
II. IMPACT OF YOUNGBERG v ROMEO
In the recent Supreme Court case of Youngberg v. Romeo,62 an involunta-
rily committed citizen, severely afflicted with mental retardation, brought a
section 1983 action against state institution officials, seeking damages for
456 F. Supp. 1211, 1275 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir.
1980); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd
in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979); Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216
(E.D. La. 1976); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 451 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Welsch v.
Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
52. Davis v. Buckley, 526 F. Supp. 985, 990-91 (E.D. Va. 1981).
53. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
54. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 374 (4th Cir.), cert. denied., 106 S. Ct. 1992
(1986); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir.
1984); Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634, 638 (3d Cir. 1982); Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1313, 1314; Nelson
v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1979).
55. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
56. Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
57. Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Eckerhart, 475 F. Supp. at 922;
Rone, 473 F. Supp. at 125, Evans, 459 F. Supp. at 484; Gary W, 437 F. Supp. at 1216; Eu-
banks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 502; Les-
sard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
Note that in Eubanks, although the Court found this right it left open the issue as to whether
there is also a right to treatment, again demonstrating the distinction between the two rights.
58. Clark, 613 F. Supp. at 702; Association for Retarded Citizens of N.D., 561 F. Supp.
486.
59. Garrity v. Whalen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 237 (D.N.H. 1981).
60. Scott, 691 F.2d at 638; Dilmore v. Stubbs, 636 F.2d 966, 969-70 (5th Cir. 1981); Cov-
ington, 419 F.2d at 623.
61. Societyfor Good Will to Retarded Children, 737 F.2d at 1248.
62. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The Court held that by virtue
of the due process clause, Romeo enjoyed constitutionally protected rights to
reasonable care and safety, to freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints,
and to a sufficient level of training 63 necessary to reasonably protect and
facilitate those interests.64 To determine what is "reasonable," the Court
held that deference must be given to the judgment exercised by qualified
professionals, whose decisions are presumptively valid.65
The Johnson holding remains, for the most part, good law following
Youngberg with only minor variations. Federal courts after Youngberg may
still order community placement for involuntary confinees, based on viola-
tions of either the constitutional right to treatment or the constitutional right
to confinement in the least restrictive setting.
A. The Right to Treatment
1. Narrowing the Right
Regarding an individual's right to treatment, Youngberg adds two dimen-
sions. First, the Court limits this right to treatment to that which will rea-
sonably protect identifiable liberty interests. This limitation, however, does
not preclude a right to community treatment for many committed individu-
als. Critically, the Court notes: "A court properly may start with the gener-
alization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic
requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar to courts, may be stated as
that training which is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and
the circumstances of the case.' '6 6 The rights were limited to that which
would enable plaintiff-respondent Romeo to reasonably protect his interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint because those freedoms were the
only two liberty interests at stake. Being severely retarded, Romeo expressly
conceded that no amount of training would move him toward release and
freedom from state control, 67 and he did not seek placement in the
community.
Thus, it is arguable that under different circumstances, committed individ-
uals who are less severely afflicted and who possess greater potential for
independent living would possess additional liberty interests such as freedom
63. "Training" and "treatment" are used interchangeably. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
311 n.5.
64. Id. at 324.
65. The court vacated and remanded the case on the grounds that the lower court had
incorrectly instructed the jury to apply an eighth amendment standard of liability. Id. at 324-
25.
66. Id. at 319 n.25 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 317.
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from confinement and freedom from all or partial state control of their lives.
With Youngberg mandating that the right to minimally adequate treatment
for confinees requires treatment that would reasonably enable them to
achieve any attainable liberty interests, substantive due process under
Youngberg may guarantee those confined a right to community-based
treatment.
2. Defining Professional Judgment
A second dimension which the Youngberg decision adds to the Johnson
analysis is that it requires professional deference in determining what treat-
ment is reasonable. This deference, however, is itself qualified and, arguably,
may not occur if the professional bases his decision on administrative (rather
than clinical) factors.
In defining the extent to which professional deference is warranted, the
Youngberg Court offered a working definition of the professional to whom
this deference is to be given:
By "professional" decisionmaker [sic], we mean a person compe-
tent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the
particular decision at issue. Long-term treatment decisions nor-
mally should be made by persons with degrees in medicine or nurs-
ing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychology,
physical therapy, or the care and training of the retarded.6"
The court in Clark v. Cohen 69 rigorously applied this definition to conclude
that the professional deference mandated by Youngberg is limited to purely
clinical decisions. Reasoning that the Supreme Court did not mean "to
include decisions motivated out of budgetary constraints in the category of
'professional judgment,' "70 the Clark court concluded that a decision
requiring deference must be "based on medical or psychological criteria and
not on exigency, administrative convenience, or other non-medical crite-
ria."'" Although the Youngberg court specifically stated that budgetary con-
straints may provide the factual predicate for a defense of good faith
immunity from a section 1983 suit for damages,72 the Clark court correctly
recognized that this statement did not mean that such considerations should
provide a bar to prospective equitable relief. In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on the Third Circuit case of Scott v. Plante.73
68. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30.
69. 613 F. Supp. 684, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
70. Id. at 704 n. 13.
71. Id. at 704.
72. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
73. 691 F.2d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Even in a situation in which professional judgment had not been unani-
mous, at least one court following Youngberg has found a due process right
to community-based treatment and demonstrated a willingness to scrutinize
the professional judgment to ensure it was not a guise for administrative
convenience. In Thomas S. v. Morrow,74 a federal court granted a motion for
summary judgment in favor of a borderline mentally retarded plaintiff who
claimed that the state violated his due process right to treatment. Although
many of the treating clinicians had recommended community placement,
some had recommended that the plaintiff remain in the institution." Lan-
guage in the opinion suggests that the court, after discussing Youngberg, did
not give deference to the recommendations for institutional placement be-
cause those judgments had been based on budgetary limitations. The court
specifically stated that: "To the extent that any professionally prescribed
treatment differed from that set forth above, it differed because the profes-
sional's stated judgment was modified to conform to the available treatment,
rather than to the appropriate treatment, for the plaintiff's condition."76
The Thomas court, quoting Youngberg went on to reason that: "To the ex-
tent that a professional's judgment of the appropriate treatment is shown to
have been modified to fit what is available, that judgment likely has become
'a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment practice, or
standards.' ,77
The judicial check on potential abuse of the Youngberg deference is partic-
ularly critical to an analysis similar to that of the Johnson court which at
least semantically distinguished between "available" and "alternative" right
to placement in the least restrictive setting. In articulately stating the prob-
lem, the Thomas S. court noted that under Youngberg, "consideration of
budgetary constraints is not proper when defining [the] constitutional right,"
though it is a proper factor in determining relief where damages are
sought.
78
The Thomas S. approach offers a way for the Johnson court to effectuate
its strong desire to consider fiscal feasibility and yet at the same time to
honor the Clark court's appropriate qualification of the deference mandated
74. 601 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 781
F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986). Despite affirming the case, the Fourth Circuit softened the language
somewhat on appeal. It noted that Youngberg's absolute defense of lack of funds did not apply
to prospective relief and that, although professional judgment may involve some consideration
of financial reasonableness, Youngberg "did not allow the professionals free rein." Thomas S.,
781 F.2d at 375.
75. Thomas S., 601 F. Supp. at 1059.
76. Id (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1060.
78. Id. at 1059-60.
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by Youngberg: the Johnson court should limit the definition of the particular
plaintiff's quid pro quo right to treatment to purely clinical decisions-but
could consider fiscal feasibility as the next step when fashioning relief.
3. Different Holdings in Other Post- Youngberg Cases
Several federal courts following Youngberg have denied plaintiffs' claims
to community-based treatment and likewise have concluded that their con-
stitutional (quid pro quo) rights to treatment have not been infringed. These
cases, however, are reconcilable with those that have found such a constitu-
tional violation based on inherent factual differences. In Society for Good
Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 9 the Second Circuit found no constitu-
tional violation because the treating clinicians recommended institutional
care. Indeed, the Clark court, itself, distinguished its decision from that of
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children based on factual, rather than
legal, differences."0
Similarly, the court in Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v.
Olson,"l denied relief to a class of institutionalized mentally retarded citizens
who sought, inter alia, alternative placements. The involved clinicians did
not recommend the alternative placements which plaintiffs sought. The
court implied, however, that if the professional judgment involved had gone
the other way, it would have found a violation.
8 2
B. The Right to Confinement in the Least Restrictive Setting
1. Does The Right Exist After Youngberg?
The issue of Youngberg's impact on the continued validity of a constitu-
tional right to civil confinement in the least restrictive setting focuses on the
Court's statement that "[iun determining whether a substantive right pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance
the 'liberty of the individual' and 'the demands of an organized society.' "83
Although this issue has not been addressed by either courts or commenta-
tors, on the surface this language appears to suggest that a balancing test,
rather than the stricter standard enunciated in either Shelton v. Tucker"4 or
79. 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (2d Cir. 1984).
80. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
81. 561 F. Supp. 473, 486-87 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd in part, remanded on other grounds,
713 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1983).
82. Id. at 486.
83. 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 307 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
84. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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Roe v. Wade,85 is the correct standard of review to apply to civil commit-
ments. One could argue that at best, civil confinees possess due process
rights to confinement in a manner which is not disproportionately restrictive
of their liberties, relative to the relevant state interests. To further support
this argument, one would attempt to reconcile the analysis with the Shelton-
Griswold-Roe framework by arguing that judicial review of state executive
action is judged by a more relaxed standard than state legislative action be-
cause of administrative and economic factors. There is support for this con-
tention in Youngberg, such as the following:
At the same time, this standard is lower than the "compelling" or
"substantial" necessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a
State to meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than
absolute safety. We think this requirement would place an undue
burden on the administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and
also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional judg-
ment as to the needs of residents.86
Despite the apparent strength of this argument, however, it is flawed. The
stronger view is that Youngberg does not even implicitly deny the existence
of a due process right to civil confinement in the least restrictive setting.
This is demonstrated by four points. First, the Court did not even address
the right to confinement in the least restrictive setting since it was not raised
nor was it relevant; Romeo did not seek community placement nor was he
capable of it.87
Second, if the Youngberg Court is suggesting a new due process standard
of review, it is inconsistent in its source. In the same paragraph, the Court
supports its use of a "balancing test" with language espousing an even more
lenient standard of review. Citing Bell v. Wolfish,88 the Court explained that
"we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legit-
imate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment."8 9 This
language is even less reconcilable with the substantive due process analyses
involving fundamental rights in Roe and Griswold. Perhaps the way to rec-
oncile these cases and to find consistency in the Court's opinion is to view
the balancing test in Youngberg not as establishing a new standard of review
which initially defines the right to confinement in the least restrictive setting,
but as providing a way to determine whether or not the right has been vio-
lated. Thus, the Court decided that plaintiff-respondent Romeo possessed
85. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
86. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322.
87. Id. at 317.
88. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
89. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.
Johnson v. Solomon
rights to reasonable care and safety, to freedom from unreasonable bodily
restraints, and to such training as may be required by those interests. The
court then balanced those rights against the state's interests to determine
whether a violation occurred by deferring to professional judgment. Stated
more simply, whereas the Shelton and Roe standards of review guarantee to
the involuntary confinee a substantive due process right to confinement in
the least restrictive setting, Youngberg may implicitly require that a balanc-
ing test be utilized to determine the practicability or reasonableness of the
less restrictive alternative sought.
A third response to the argument that Youngberg rejects a constitutional
right to confinement in the least restrictive setting is to recognize that even if
Youngberg changes the standard of review for civil commitment from the
Shelton-Roe-Griswold standard to a balancing test, the consequences remain
similar. Whether the constitutional right is to confinement in the least re-
strictive setting or to confinement in a setting which is not overly restrictive
relative to the state interests involved, community placement may be the
resulting manifestation of both constructions where the placements, or the
funds necessary to develop the placements, are available, or where the funds
can be made available by creatively shuffling priorities.
Fourth, and most convincingly, although the Youngberg Court did not
even address the validity of a confinee's right to confinement in the least
restrictive setting, lower courts subsequent to Youngberg have addressed this
issue. Two such courts have either expressly or implicitly noted that the
constitutional right to confinement in the least restrictive setting still exists,
while one court seemed to recognize its existence in a modified form.
Although not specifically applying Youngberg in this part of its opinion, the
court in Clark based part of its holding on the due process right to confine-
ment in the least restrictive setting.9" Similarly, the Third Circuit in Scott
implicitly recognized the right to confinement in the least restrictive setting
when it stated that Youngberg required no essential modification of its prior
judgment which was in part based on this right.9 1 Finally, the court in Asso-
ciation for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota noted:
[W]hile the Youngberg decision does not directly address this spe-
cific right, the Court's analysis indicates that it would reject an
absolute right to the least restrictive alternatives. . . . Following
this analysis, this court must conclude that a constitutional right to
the least restrictive method of care or treatment exists only insofar
as professional judgment determines that such alternatives would
measurably enhance the resident's enjoyment of basic liberty
90. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 702, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
91. Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634, 639 (3d Cir. 1983).
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interests.9 2
One could argue that the court in Association for Retarded Citizens of North
Dakota was, in effect, saying that an involuntary confinee does not possess
the Shelton right to confinement in the least restrictive setting as a second
right, independent from the right to minimally adequate treatment. How-
ever, a better reading is that the court was merely suggesting that the Shelton
right, as with the right to minimally adequate treatment, is limited in its
definition by deference to professional judgment.
In other language which may on the surface suggest the extinction of the
right to least restrictive confinement, the Youngberg Court noted that Ro-
meo possessed a constitutional right to freedom from unreasonable bodily
restraints, that reasonableness being determined by balancing the interests of
the state against those of the confinee.93 A parallel could be drawn between
bodily restraints once within the institution and the overall confinement of
being in the institution involuntarily (whether it be a locked facility or one
which nonetheless requires that the confinee remain). It could be argued
that Youngberg, at best, guarantees only a right to a reasonably nonrestric-
tive placement. Although somewhat appealing, this argument has two flaws.
First, in Youngberg, the confinee did not seek community placement and
so acquiesced to the state's control in terms of confinement in the institution.
In contrast, however, many involuntary confinees who seek community
placement contest the initial act of confinement in the institution. The paral-
lel breaks down at this critical point. Whereas a test of reasonableness may
be appropriate where a citizen acquiesces and perhaps even desires state con-
trol yet at the same time contests one particular part of it, this more liberal
test would not be appropriate where a citizen resists the state control in all
forms at all times.
Second, even if the parallel stands, since the Supreme Court required a
balancing test to determine what is reasonably nonrestrictive, then involun-
tary confinees after Youngberg who possess the potential for community
placement possess a right to placement in a setting which is not overly re-
strictive relative to the state's interests. For many confinees, this setting will
involve community placements.94
92. Association for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 486 (S.W.N.D.
1982).
93. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320-22.
94. In an interesting but unsound reading of Youngberg, one commentator has suggested
that when a person is committed for the purpose of treatment rather than for protection,
Youngberg demands the "most effective treatment alternative" and not the least restrictive
treatment alternative. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment. A Critique of Revi-
sions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment,
39 VAND. L. REV. 83, 105 (1986). This argument has two flaws. First, Youngberg clearly
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2. Should Courts Defer to Professional Judgment Regarding the Right
to Confinement in the Least Restrictive Setting?
Unlike the quid pro quo right to treatment, the Shelton right to confine-
ment in the least restrictive setting primarily focuses on the level of state
infringement upon personal liberty, not the mode of mental health treat-
ment. Thus, one could argue that although courts have no expertise regard-
ing the mode of treatment, they are adequately equipped to determine the
constitutional level of state infringement. Therefore, the Youngberg require-
ment of deference to professional judgment regarding the quid pro quo right
to treatment need not apply to the Shelton right to confinement in the least
restrictive setting.
This argument, however, fails for two reasons. First, the Shelton right as
applied to involuntary confinees will vary widely depending on the ability of
the mentally ill or mentally retarded citizen to function. Thus, clinical ex-
pertise is necessary to help determine what setting is "least restrictive" for
each confinee.
A second reason for applying the Youngberg requirement of professional
deference to the Shelton right is that the Youngberg Court's rationale for
requiring this deference was based not only on the issue of expertise, but also
on concerns for federalism and undesirable "interference by the federal judi-
ciary with the internal operations of these [state] institutions. . . ."' This
concern regarding the right to treatment is equally viable regarding the
Shelton right. Therefore, it would appear that after Youngberg a federal
court should defer to professional judgment when determining the scope of
the confinee's constitutional right to confinement in the least restrictive
setting.
III. FASHIONING RELIEF
Having clarified the two constitutional rights espoused by the Johnson
court and colored by Youngberg, the issue of relief for violations of a con-
finee's rights to treatment and to confinement in the least restrictive setting is
now examined. Throughout this section, it is assumed that a violation has
been found. That is, a determination has been made based on purely clinical
criteria, that as to the quid pro quo right to treatment, the involuntary con-
limited the right to treatment to only "minimally adequate treatment," and drew no distinc-
tions with regard to the state's commitment purpose. 457 U.S. at 322. Second, since the
confinee's constitutional rights arguably arise because of the government's forced intervention,
it is logical that a confinee's right may focus on the freedom from certain forms of control,
regardless of the state's purpose for intervention. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317.
95. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23.
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finee shows potential for living independently of state control and that com-
munity-based treatment is reasonably necessary to enable the confinee to
regain that liberty interest. As to the Shelton right, it is assumed that profes-
sional judgment, based on purely clinical criteria, advises that for the indi-
vidual confinee, community placement is the least restrictive form of state
control which adequately accomplishes the state's goals, whether it be treat-
ment of the confinee, protection of the confinee, or protection of the public.
The issue of relief is particularly difficult, as the Johnson court articulately
explained, because of the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved
between federal equitable power and State administration of its own laws."9 6
The court cautioned that "a Federal judge rearranging a State's penal or
education system is like a man feeding candy to his grandchild. He derives a
great deal of personal satisfaction from it and has no responsibility for the
results."97 Yet the court finally concluded that:
At the same time, a federal court has an obligation to announce
and apply constitutional standards as well as to monitor their im-
plementation. To find otherwise would, in effect, be to write the
Supremacy Clause out of the Constitution altogether. Although
there are obvious practical limits on the extent to which a federal
court can command expenditures from the State treasury, the fact
that guaranteeing a constitutional right may call for additional
State funding is not a valid defense to a constitutional
requirement.98
The case law to date suggests three distinct approaches for reaching this
delicate balance. The Johnson court might apply either of the last two ap-
proaches today, with some variation.
A. Substantive Injunctive Relief
Regarding substantive injunctive relief, a category which includes two
specific approaches, several points require clarification. First, as with consti-
tutionally inadequate prison conditions, the federal court which orders sub-
stantive injunctive relief for violations of a confinee's due process rights is
not legislating a state's budget; not conclusively requiring it to spend more
money on services. Rather, it is forcing the state to choose between exerting
its power within constitutional limits or not exerting its power at all. 99
96. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 297 (D. Md. 1979) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 378 (1976)).
97. See id. (citing McRedmond v. Wilson, 553 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafei-
land J., dissenting)).
98. See id. at 297-98.
99. See Association for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 486
(S.W.N.D. 1982).
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Second, although dictum in the Supreme Court case of Dandridge v. Wil-
liams 0 is often cited as prohibiting a federal court from ordering substan-
tive relief which would require additional state expenditures, there is a
marked difference between reviewing a state's allocation of gratuitous serv-
ices among passive recipients and limiting the manner in which a state can
physically confine a non-criminal. Ordering extensive improvements in the
treatment operations for the confinees/plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit in Wyatt
v. Aderholto noted:
It goes without saying that state legislatures are ordinarily free to
choose among various social services competing for legislative at-
tention and state funds. But that does not mean that a state legisla-
ture is free, for budgetary or any other reasons, to provide a social
service in a manner which will result in the denial of individuals'
constitutional rights.
10 2
Having clarified these two points, attention is now given to two distinct ways
in which federal courts have fashioned this substantive injunctive relief.
1. No Express Consideration of Budgetary Constraints
Although the Johnson court did not itself disregard budgetary constraints,
it supported its holding °3 with at least four federal district courts cases,
dealing with eighth amendment claims in prisons and juvenile detention cen-
ters, which used language effectively precluding the consideration of budget-
ary constraints even in the fashioning of relief."° In these district court
cases, the courts ordered substantial, expensive improvements in conditions
and operations. As to any argument that eighth amendment violations re-
garding prison conditions are more deserving of substantive relief than are
violations of due process rights of civil confinees, if any difference exists at
all, since a state has stronger interests in restraining criminals than it does in
confining mentally ill and mentally retarded citizens, logic would suggest
that a court would be more likely to order intrusive, substantive relief for the
confinees than for the criminals. As the state interest becomes weaker, a
court's willingness to focus on the conflicting individual interest should pro-
portionately increase.
At least two pre-Youngberg cases which found violations of confinees' sub-
100. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
101. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
102. Id. at 1314-15.
103. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 297, 301 n.28 (D. Md. 1979).
104. Palmigiana v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D.R.I. 1977); Martarella v. Kelly, 359
F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Inmate of the Boys Training School v. Afflick, 346 F.
Supp. 1354, 1374 (D.R.I. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (N.D. Ohio
1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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stantive due process rights arguably fashioned substantive relief without a
consideration of the states' budgetary constraints. As described previously,
in ordering expensive improvements in care, based on a violation of the
plaintiffs' quid pro quo rights to treatment, the Fifth Circuit in Wyatt ex-
pressly rejected the defendants' argument that fiscal burdens should be con-
sidered."°5 Similarly, the district court in Rone v. Fireman 106 found
violations of substantive due process rights to treatment and to placement in
the least restrictive setting; and then, without any discussion of fiscal feasibil-
ity, ordered changes involving immense expenditures for staff, transporta-
tion, programming, and the physical plant.
10 7
If construed very broadly, several post-Youngberg cases imply a similar
approach to fashioning substantive relief. The courts in Scott, 08 Clark,109
and Thomas S. 110 may be construed as suggesting that since the professional
judgment requiring judicial deference cannot involve a consideration of
budgetary constraints, then a state's fiscal burdens are not to be considered
at all when a federal court is defining a constitutional right and determining
a violation. Also, since the Youngberg consideration of budgetary con-
straints in fashioning relief is specific to damages, then a federal court may
completely ignore fiscal burdens when fashioning prospective relief. How-
ever, the better view would be that although Youngberg - as construed by
the Clark and Thomas S. courts - probably precludes the professional from
considering budgetary constraints when helping the court to define the rights
and determine the violations, the Youngberg Court's strong concern for fed-
eralism 11 implies that fiscal feasibility should be considered to some degree
when fashioning relief.
2. Express or Implied Consideration of Fiscal Feasibility
The most rigorous reading of pre- and post-Youngberg decisions suggests
that a majority of federal courts have ordered substantive injunctive relief for
violations of rights to treatment and to confinement in the least restrictive
setting, considering fiscal feasibility when fashioning this relief. During the
exploration of these cases, it is important to keep in mind that whenever a
court seeks to fashion relief in this manner, a certain factual question regard-
ing the financial reasonableness of developing community placements will
105. Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1314-15.
106. 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
107. Id. at 133-35.
108. Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 1983).
109. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
110. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 601 F. Supp. 1055, 1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
111. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
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inevitably arise and be litigated on a case-by-case basis: while most authori-
ties agree that after an initial period, community-based treatment will cost
less than institutional care,
1 12 this view is not universal.' 13
In Welsch, one of the key cases relied on by the Johnson court, the district
court expressly considered fiscal reasonableness, and the Eighth Circuit on
appeal implied such a consideration.1 14 Before ordering significant, substan-
tive relief regarding changes in the institutional care and the development of
less restrictive alternatives, the district court found violations of the state's
constitutional duties to provide "adequate" treatment and "to explore and
provide the least stringent practicable alternatives to confinement." '11 5 Thus,
a condition of financial reasonableness was part of the analysis.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit implied the same consideration when,
although vacating and remanding on other grounds, it expressly ratified the
legal basis of the district court's order.1 16 Note that to consider fiscal feasi-
bility in fashioning relief does not mean that a court will accept a defense of
insufficient funds. Rather, it suggests that a court will either limit the scope
of the right with an express condition of financial reasonableness or find a
violation but limit substantive injunctive relief to that which is reasonably
affordable. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit clearly rejected the state's defense of
lack of funds as demonstrated by this statement of the court:
There must be no mistake in the matter. The obligation of the
defendants to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not de-
pend upon what the legislature may do, or upon what the Gover-
nor may do, or, indeed upon what the defendants may be able to
accomplish with means available to them. As stated, if Minnesota
is going to operate institutions like Cambridge, their operation is
112. See Clark, 613 F. Supp. at 707; Rapson, supra note 2, at 200. Finally, in a recent
telephone interview, the Assistant Director for Administration for the Maryland Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene estimated that the average yearly cost of institutional care per
person ranges from $51,000 to $72,000, whereas the average yearly cost of community-based
care per person is approximately $35,000.
113. See Association for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 483
(S.W.N.D. 1982) in which the court held that community placement was not necessarily less
expensive despite studies in evidence to the contrary since partial hidden costs were shifted to
private citizens and to the local government such as for police protection and hospital care.
The problems with this approach are threefold: first, the increases in these local costs are
diffused and relatively insignificant; second, the fact that private citizens and local govern-
ments may absorb some of the cost should have nothing to do with determining the reasona-
bleness of the cost relative to the defendant state; and third, many community placements
successfully help patients return to the work force during treatment, an economic factor not
considered by the Olson court.
114. Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
115. Id. at 499, 502 (emphasis added).
116. Welsch, 550 F.2d at 1132.
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going to have to be consistent with the Constitution of the United
States. 117
In similarly strong language, the court warned the soon-to-convene Minne-
sota legislature that if it did not respond to the district court's requirements,
the court would be forced to act harshly.1 18
Although this strong language may appear to completely preclude a con-
sideration of fiscal feasibility, the context of the court's opinion implies that
such a consideration was still potentially influential. This position is
supported for example, by the court of appeals' express approval of the dis-
trict court's decision which limited recognized individual rights with a con-
dition of financial reasonableness. Likewise, this position is supported by the
fact that the court of appeals expressed its belief that the necessary funds
could be made available through a reasonable re-shuffling of budgetary
priorities. 119
The decision in Clark 120 is most accurately construed as considering fi-
nancial reasonableness in fashioning relief, although this was not a factor in
the initial definition of constitutional rights or the determination of a viola-
tion. Strongly rejecting the defendants' argument of lack of funds, the court
ordered the defendants to develop a community placement for the plaintiff.
Yet, the court implied that it had considered fiscal feasibility in the fashion-
ing of relief to some degree.12 1 First, it noted its understanding that funds
were actually available or at least could be made available through a re-
shuffling of budgetary priorities. Second, the court commented that the de-
fendants had never requested more funds for community programs. Third,
the court stated its belief that the cost of one community placement was
relatively nominal and that after the initial investment, community place-
ments in general are less expensive than institutional care.
As explained previously, the court in Gary W., another key case in the
Johnson opinion, can be construed as suggesting substantive relief in certain
cases, which, however, would be limited by a condition of financial reasona-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1132-33 ("In any event, we desire to make it clear to the present Governor and
the current Legislature that the requirements of the 1974 Order and the requirements of the
April 15, 1976 Order that we uphold today are positive, constitutional requirements, and can-
not be ignored .... There is no suggestion that Minnesota lacks the funds necessary to enable
the Department of Public Welfare to meet the requirements of the district court. The question
is what priority the Legislature, in the face of competing demands for State funds, is willing to
accord to its institutions for the mentally retarded.").
119. Id.
120. Clark, 613 F. Supp. at 705.
121. Id. at 706-07 (Only 25% of the budget for the state mental retardation services had
been allocated to community programs and some of that portion had been left unused and
returned at the end of the fiscal year.).
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bleness.' 22 Based on the rights to treatment and to confinement in the least
restrictive setting, the court ordered the defendants to prepare treatment
plans semi-annually and "to consider the least restrictive alternative for the
child, but the State will not be required to develop an entire new system of
facilities to implement the plan."12  Although one could read Gary W. nar-
rowly as requiring only that the state consider the alternatives presently
available, the language more accurately implies a very moderate, reasonable
amount of substantive direction, such as court-ordered program implemen-
tation which although involving some financially reasonable resource devel-
opment, would still fall far short of creating an entire new system of
facilities.
As previously argued, the better reading of Johnson similarly suggests that
the court did not preclude substantive relief as long as it is financially rea-
sonable. Thus, involuntary confinees possess substantive due process rights
to reasonably affordable treatment and to placement in the least restrictive
setting which is adequate to serve the state's narrowly-tailored purpose and
which is financially reasonable.
Indeed, regardless of what the Johnson court intended in 1978, the Fourth
Circuit's affirmance of an order for substantive relief in Thomas S. v. Mor-
row 124 commands the view that a federal district court in Maryland in 1987
should not automatically preclude substantive relief in all circumstances.
Even a more narrow construction of Johnson suggests that although the
court may have precluded substantive relief in that case, this preclusion was
conditioned on the state's good faith and reasonable progress in developing
community resources which the court referred to at length in different parts
of its opinion. 125 Of particular importance is the court's reliance on defend-
ants' testimony which demonstrated that in the ten years prior to 1978, the
Maryland State Mental Hygiene Administration had seen a sixty percent
decrease in its institutional population and had increased its expenditures for
community services from $200,000 to $14,000,000, an increase of seven
thousand percent. Apparently, the court felt that the state's good faith pro-
gress in that case precluded the necessity of substantively interfering by or-
dering development that was already taking place as quickly as possible.
However, even according to this more narrow reading, the Johnson court
should have ordered the development of community programs that are fi-
nancially reasonable in the proper circumstances if the court were faced with
statistics which suggested that the state's good faith commitment no longer
122. Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
123. Id. at 1219 (emphasis added).
124. 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986).
125. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 310-11 (D. Md. 1979).
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existed and which implied that even though the community programs were
not available intact, the funds necessary to develop them were.
The situation described above would arise if a suit were brought against
the Maryland State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("DHMH")
today by involuntary confinees possessing the potential for independent liv-
ing and for whom the treating clinicians advised community-based treat-
ment. During the nine years since the 1978 case, despite a forty percent
decrease in average daily populations in its mental hospitals, the DHMH has
increased its budgetary allocation to community programs from twelve per-
cent in 1978 to only eighteen percent in 1986. The other eighty-two percent
was allocated to institutional care. 126 These grim statistics compare poorly
to the seven thousand percent increase in community service expenditures
which the Johnson court had seen in 1978 with the Mental Hygiene
Administration.
Indeed, if the Johnson court did not order the reasonable development of
community resources in light of these facts, then it would be grossly shirking
its self-proclaimed "obligation to announce and apply constitutional stan-
dards as well as to monitor their implementation," and would be at odds
with its tenet that "although there are obvious practical limits on the extent
to which a federal court can command expenditures from the state treasury,
the fact that guaranteeing a constitutional right may call for additional state
funding is not a valid defense to a constitutional requirement."'
127
B. Procedural Relief
Procedural relief is certainly the least intrusive means of fashioning relief
and has some support from the oft-cited case of Dandridge v. Williams 121 in
which the Court stated: "The Constitution may impose certain procedural
safeguards upon systems of welfare administration .... But the Constitution
does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the
difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the
myriad of potential recipients." 129
In view of the decision in Dandridge, Professor Tribe stated that "the no-
tion of special judicial competence in the area of procedure, as distinguished
from that of substance, may derive some support from Justice Stewart's
[concluding] statement. '"130
126. Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, Memorandum of Jan. 9, 1986
(from the Director to Mental Hygiene Administration Executive Council).
127. Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 297-98.
128. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
129. Id. at 487.
130. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 537 (1978).
Johnson v. Solomon
However, as explained previously, although procedural relief can often be
the least instrusive, it may err on the other side, i.e., shirking an obligation to
protect adequately the constitutional rights of citizens. The Clark court
noted that if a court merely enjoins a state from institutionalizing citizens
where suitable community programs already exist then "the defendants
could simply refuse to allocate funds for any community placements and
institutionalize all mentally retarded persons."13' Also, even assuming a
lack of bad faith, the approach offers no incentive for creative budgeting and
places the power and duty of defining the scope of citizens' constitutional
rights in the hands of state budget administrators.
Despite these obvious limitations it is still possible, though not likely, that
one could read Johnson and similar cases such as Gary W. in the most nar-
row sense, suggesting that the Johnson court's express preference for proce-
dural relief was not conditioned on Maryland's good faith commitment.
With this unlikely construction, there is only one readily apparent way in
which the Johnson court could deal with Maryland's grim statistics of 1986
and yet stay even remotely consistent with its 1978 opinion. Consistent with
its preference to attempt first procedural intervention, the court could bor-
row the relief model in the Supreme Court case of Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Commission,'32 and place on the state the burden of demonstrat-
ing that community placements, as well as the funds necessary to develop




Consistent with many federal courts in the late 1970's,' 34 the court in
Johnson recognized that involuntary confinees possess substantive due pro-
cess rights to treatment and to placement in the least restrictive setting.' 35
The two rights differ both in theory and consequence: the former is based on
a quid pro quo exchange of treatment for confinement with relatively few
procedural safeguards; the latter is based on the "least drastic means" stan-
dard of review of state deprivation of individual liberty. Constructions of
131. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
132. 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) ("When discrimination against commerce of the type we
have found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of non-discriminatory alternatives ade-
quate to preserve the local interests at stake.")(emphasis added).
133. For a somewhat similar proposal, see Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond Rouse and Wyatt:
An Administrative-Law Model for Expanding and Implementing the Mental Patient's Right to
Treatment, 61 VA. L. REV. 297, 310-11 (1975).
134. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
135. Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979).
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the right to least restrictive confinement differ as to whether that setting
must be presently available or merely reasonably affordable. A review of
relevant cases suggests that the the better view is that the setting must be
reasonably affordable.' 36
Subsequent to Johnson, the Supreme Court decided Youngberg which al-
lowed Johnson to remain good law with some variations. 137 Although the
Court did not expressly or implicitly address the right to least restrictive
confinement, it did limit the right to treatment to that treatment which is
reasonably necessary to achieve recognized liberty interests. Also, it re-
quired that great deference be given to professional judgment in the determi-
nation of what is reasonable. Federal courts subsequent to Youngberg have
qualified this precept, giving the required deference only when the judgment
is based on purely clinical criteria and does not involve a consideration of
budgetary constraints.' 38 The better reading of Youngberg would apply the
professional deference requirement to the right to least restrictive confine-
ment as well, consequently giving great deference to professional judgment
in the determination of what setting is "least restrictive" for the individual
confinee. 3 9
Finally, most courts, and even the better reading of Johnson, suggest that
where the clinicians have advised community placement, the court should
order the development of financially reasonable programs if they do not ex-
ist. ' 4 Even the most narrow reading of cases such as Johnson would recog-
nize that if faced with grim statistics showing that a state is seriously lacking
in a reasonable commitment to develop these community programs, these
courts would either order the development of community programs where
reasonably affordable or at least require the states to demonstrate that the
funds necessary to develop them are either unavailable or cannot be obtained
through a reasonable re-shuffling of budgetary priorities.
Scott Rose
136. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
137. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
138. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 103-127 and accompanying text.
